72th Zaron Lecture Presentation


Hosted by AU ZARON 2012

Speaker : Dr. William Brooks Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University (SAIS)
Date and Time : November 29th (Thu) 4:30 pm - 5:50 pm
Venue : SIS Founders Room, American University
Number of Participants: 40

Miwa Okajima is responsible for this report
Program
4:15 pm Venue opened for participants
4:30 pm Lecture begin, Greetings by the host Shun Ishihata
5:15 pm Q&A
5:30 pm Lecture end

Lecture Summary

1. Introduction

Professor William Brooks

- worked for the US Embassy of Japan
- served under 7 Ambassadors in a row
- retired in 2009
- Currently Professor of Japanese Foreign Policy at the SAIS
- Involved in the issues of Okinawa for 50 years of the career
- 1995 rape incident in Okinawa
  - President Clinton promised to return Futenma to Japan within a reasonable amount of time
  - But the base is still open even 15 years later when retired

Today’s subject

- Why has the Futenma base remained open so long?
  - Have studied for several years to seek the answer to the issue
  - Wrote two books, could write the third book

2. Okinawa: The Island Prefecture

- Snap shot of Okinawa
  - where you would like to go for vacation, ideal world, beautiful country
  - Tragic battle of Okinawa in WWII→The destroyed Shuri Castle was restored.
  - Beautiful beaches, awesome aquarium
- Governor Nakaima’s visit of DC
  - Ideally, the purpose should have been to encourage people to come visit
- Two realities of Okinawa
  - 74% of bases exist in Okinawa
  - Located in East China sea, geostrategic interest of China for water and energy
    - Senkaku/Diaoyu and Ishigaki Islands are a part of Okinawa
    - Adds to the geostrategic significance of Okinawa and makes the U.S. bases more important

3. The U.S, Military Base in Futenma

- Location: Downtown in Ginowan city
- Unsuccessful attempts of relocation three times
- Density of population around the base
● Helicopter function (MB22 Osprey)
● Kadena air base
  ○ Runways, High population density
  ○ One of the solutions
    ■ will create another Futenma
    ■ unrealistic solution
● Growing population
  ○ School cannot be removed
● Camp Schwab
● Cape Henoko, Nago city
  ○ Protest against the Henoko plan ever since 1990s
  ○ Environmental concern
  ○ needs some kinds of rehabilitation
    ■ Quiet, undeveloped area
● Two incidents building up anger
  ○ 1995 rape incident
  ○ 2004 Helicopter crush to Okinawa International University
● The Proposal of 1996
  ○ Relocate to Kadena air base
  ○ The relocation of the sea base facility was settled.
● Fight over what kind of sea facilitate to be built
  ○ Filling in the land
    ■ Jobs for the local construction companies
  ○ Removable steel runway
    ■ High technology, complicated facility- has to come from the mainland
  ○ Result: Local contractors won.
    ■ Environmentalist occupied the spot to prevent further environmental assessment
    ■ 2004 incident: no accomplishment had been made
● SBF Planned for Henoko
● Competing proposals in 2005
  ○ V-shape runways at Camp Schwab
  ○ Plan for a runway facility at MCAS Schwab dating back to the 1960s

4. Game Changes in 2009 –Never Ending Story-
● DPJ Tackles Okinawa Basing Issue
  ● Campaign brought to power promised moved out of Okinawa or better out of japan (“Trust me”)
    ○ Spectacle, very high level effort by Japanese government, even begging local communities
    ○ About a year running around, he accepted 2006 plan, which everything went back to square one, and hence, cape Henoko came back to existence
● Excerpts Japan-US joint statement on Futenma relocation accord 5/27/10
● Hatoyama met with governor Nakaima and crowds protests against him, which resulted in out of his hand
● Kan met governor Nakayama to fulfill 2010 agreement, trust declining simultaneously
● Kan did virtually nothing to resolve the Futenma impasse
● The fact is that the relationship between Okinawa and central government became broken, because of the reneging of promise the facility to let out
● 3 agreements to close the base('96/ '06/ '10)
  ○ 2 additional factors in '96 and '06
    § 1st : government-to-government agreement to move the base
§ 2nd: informal political deal/understanding of local government and city of Nago government negotiation

§ No 2nd political deal had progressed but the only the 1st after DPJ came into power

• Putting humpty dumpty coming back is impossible by 3 parties
• 2010 Okinawa was out of loop faith or facility
• Noda meets governor Nakaima, and protests occur with intensifying horrible relation
• Synergy existed (e.g. emissary sent in 2nd agreement 50-60times as “Nemawashi”) which resulted in a compromise solution

5. Issues in 2012 –Worst case scenario-
• 2 issues
  o 1st: due to the ambiguity of previous vision
    (road map reversion of 5 different small bases other than Futenma and and 8,000 marines going to Guam)
    § De-linking Futenma from the whole package
    § Only pressure is political pressure
    § issue of Futenma is absolutely put on a back burner, no impetus for closure
  o 2nd issue: Osprey
    § In order to replace C46 helicopters replace no tame
    § Imaged as dangerous aircraft to dangerous base by Okinawa newspapers
    § Yet antiquated c46 will be my worries not osprey
• Why has Futenma remained opened?
  o 1st relocation was halted by environmentalists
  o 2nd negotiated pack was rejected by DPJ and searched any place outside of Okinawa
  o In 2010, reneging of the promise broke Okinawa’s trust since then

6. Solutions
• Senators Levin, McCain and Webb Propose
• Solution by Professor Brooks: take the half or dozen of Osprey to Kadena and others to kyushu (Sasebo or Iwakun)
• Another suggestion by two scholars
  o Mike Mochizuki and Mike O’Hanlon: “Rethinking Okinawa military relocation”
• Ship station off the shore is a wonderful ideal but not reality
• Actual proposal by Professor Brooks
  o The ball is now in Okinawa’s (OPG) court
  o A proactive, positive stance that ultimately produces a pragmatic win-win result is key
  o OPG should publicize a well-documented economic development plan for the reverted base lands, including Futenma, and attach a timetable and funding requirement for the central government
  o Nago (Henoko) could join the plan
  o Use economic factor (2nd fact base economy is disappearing quickly, diminished to 5%)
  o Issue of not putting a runway at Henoko has been on and odd as afar as Nago city is concerned
  o Nago city is up to the next mayor
  o Essence issue is resolvable, and there are other ways staying open

7. Q & A
Q1. Is there any foreign or Japanese government idea to use Futenma for military? (Containing China)
A1. There are even plans to self-defense-force facilities
   Because the need to defend remote islands, if the us suddenly left, self-defense-force has to come right in.
   Yet, Futenma is a dead duck and going to close too much incompetence
Getting all three together is a nightmare.

Q2. More about the complaints, date-to-date issues
A2. Constant in the alliance, everybody admits that the hosting is expenditure
   In the meantime, nothing is going to happen
   People are concerned about the crime, calling for getting station of forces of agreement (SPFA) out
   (Judiciary issue)
   Issues are quality of life
   All of this has a resulted lack of angst
   Yet divided population (around the base and others)
   Another factor is U.S. base privately own by 3,000 people in Futenma (Need to be rent)
   Income job concerns make it difficult
   “Sad dilemma”, highly complicated due to 50-60 facility

Q3. Revenue
A3. Increase of tourism income (base related is 5.4% in 2006, used to be 20% in 1970s)
   Has a potential to be independent economy
   Hub for transport

Q4. Regarding the fact that the base is geopolitically significant, does your solution have a negative impact on regional security?
A4. I do not think so, because the United States would want to avoid concentration in order to balance its risk.
   The plan is different than the 2006.
   The range of the Osprey and is actually is broad enough to cover and others are not enough.
   We have a completely different strategic environment

Q5. Why is the local media highly biased, and who should we change this situation?
A5. Local newspapers (Ryukyu-Shinpo and Okinawa Times, both advocacy journals), which are basically very critical.
   The late arrival of mainland reports makes it more to rely on those.
   Structural, traditional issue that will not allow to write in the desk office (poisoned situation).
   The local newspapers are hopeless, the television is a little better.
   Highly significant report shows perception gap between Okinawan’s and the rest of Japanese.
   (e.g. In 2012, Mainichi newspaper reported that 69% of Okinawan’s felt treated badly by the rest of Japan, due to the 74% coverage of the base. However on the other hand, asked to rest of the Japanese, only 33% felt unfair)
   One professor analyzed Okinawa as a squeaky wheel, nobody would pay attention without making a crowd
   Okinawa has to not a squeaky wheel but a proactive one
   Bringing the economy to the highest priority will solve this issue.
   Need to have a game plan

Q6. Why do they haven’t done yet?
A6. I think because of the betrayal by the DPJ, relations with the center.
   It is difficult to say yes, highly difficult to solve but it is the only solution.
   Constance for rejecting the base and valuable proactive plans
   There is momentum time to time, but frown by the negative aspects

Q7. Opinions for having an Army
A7. Conservatives Ishiba came up to the plan of re-force. (Not concrete in popular level)
   Others insights that Japan have a right for collective defense regarding the unequal security treaty.
   It would take years and generations
Do not see momentum

Lecture closed, Thank you very much.

【Photo during the lecture】
Dr. William Brooks retired from the State Department in September 2009 after a 35-year career as a diplomat, research analyst, and linguist. In his final assignment, he ran Embassy Tokyo’s media analyst and translation unit for 16 years (1993-2009), keeping the Ambassador, Embassy staff, and Washington well informed on matters of U.S. policy interest. In earlier diplomatic assignments to Embassy Tokyo, Dr. Brooks served twice in the economic section, reporting on trade, aid, and investment (1980-82) and as a trade policy advisor (1987-1990), participating in such negotiations as the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). He also served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) as senior research analyst for Northeast Asia.

Prior to government service, Dr. Brooks taught history as an assistant professor at William Paterson University of New Jersey with courses on Japan, India, World Civilization and historiography (1970-3). Later, he taught modern Japanese history as a guest lecturer at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (1978-79). His doctorate from Columbia University is on the history of minority groups in pre-modern Japan, considered a pioneer work and accepted with honors. He received language training in Japanese at the Inter-University Center for Japanese Studies (Tokyo) and in Chinese at Yale University’s Institute for Far Eastern Languages.

In addition to earlier published articles on Japanese foreign aid, public works policy, distribution and marketing system, multilateralism in Northeast Asia, and Japanese economic assistance to China, he has written two books for the Reischauer Center: The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa (2010); and Cracks in the Alliance? (2011). He also has translated a book of poetry from Japanese: Beyond the Vast Wasteland (Tokyo, 2011).

(Johns Hopkins University Web Site: http://legacy2.sais-jhu.edu/academics/regional-studies/japan/faculty/Brooks.htm)